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Abstract
Federated learning (FL) is an emerging collabora-
tive machine learning method to train models on
distributed datasets with privacy concerns. To prop-
erly incentivize data owners to contribute their ef-
forts, Shapley Value (SV) is often adopted to fairly
assess their contribution. However, the calcula-
tion of SV is time-consuming and computation-
ally costly. In this paper, we propose FedCoin, a
blockchain-based peer-to-peer payment system for
FL to enable a feasible SV based profit distribution.
In FedCoin, blockchain consensus entities calculate
SVs and a new block is created based on the proof
of Shapley (PoSap) protocol. It is in contrast to
the popular BitCoin network where consensus en-
tities “mine” new blocks by solving meaningless
puzzles. Based on the computed SVs, a scheme
for dividing the incentive payoffs among FL clients
with nonrepudiation and tamper-resistance proper-
ties is proposed. Experimental results based on
real-world data show that FedCoin can promote
high-quality data from FL clients through accu-
rately computing SVs with an upper bound on the
computational resources required for reaching con-
sensus. It opens opportunities for non-data owners
to play a role in FL.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, many businesses generate large amount of data
through usage, and rely on making informed decisions using
machine learning (ML) based on such data in order to thrive.
With changing regulatory scene, ML is facing increasingly
difficult challenges with respect to the usage of such data.
Data are often collected and owned by multiple distributed
entities. They often contain sensitive or private information
and is cannot be stored in a centralized server without violat-
ing privacy protection laws. In recent years, federated learn-
ing (FL) has emerged as a promising solution to these chal-
lenges [Yang et al., 2019a].
In FL, each entity trains its local model and contributes
the local model parameter updates to a center server to help
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build a more powerful global FL model. Compared with cen-
tralized ML methods, FL not only reduces communication
costs by transmitting model updates instead of raw data, but
also reduce the computational costs of the server by leverag-
ing computing power from the clients. Moreover, since local
data never leave the data owners, FL improves user privacy
[McMahan et al., 2017; Bonawitz et al., 2019].
From the above description, it is clear that FL clients are
making significant contributions towards the FL model. Thus,
in order to sustain an FL community, it is important for FL
clients to be properly incentivized. For this to happen, FL
clients must be treated fairly [Yu et al., 2020]. Existing FL
incentive schemes generally agree that fair treatment of FL
clients shall be based on a fair assessment of their contribu-
tions to the FL model [Kairouz et al., 2019]. Currently, the
most widely adopted method for fair assessment of FL client
contribution is that of Shapley Values (SVs) [Jia et al., 2019;
Song et al., 2019].
SV is a popular notion in fairly distributing profits earned
by a coalition among its contributors. It has been applied in
various fields, ranging from economics, information theory,
and ML. The reason for its broad application is that the SV
divides the payoff with attractive properties such as fairness,
individual rationality, and additivity. However, SV based dis-
tribution solution often takes exponential time to compute
with a complexity of O(n!) where n is the number of data
items. Even though the computational complexity can be re-
duced through approximating SV with marginal error guar-
antees [Jia et al., 2019], it is still computationally costly.
In order to help FL systems compute SVs to support sus-
tainable incentive schemes, we propose a blockchain-based
peer-to-peer payment system FedCoin. The Shapley value
of each FL client, reflecting its contribution to the global
FL model in a fair way, is calculated by the Proof of Shap-
ley (PoSap) consensus protocol which replaces the traditional
hash-based protocol in existing proof of work(PoW) based
blockchain systems. All the payments are recorded in the
block in an immutable manner. Under FedCoin, paying out
incentives to FL clients does not need to rely on a central FL
server. Based on this, FedCoin provides a decentralized pay-
ment scheme for FL so that incentives for all participants can
be delivered in third-party-free manner with nonrepudiation
and tamper-resistance properties.
Extensive experiments based on real-world data show that
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FedCoin is able to properly determine FL clients’ Shapley
Value-based contribution to the global FL model with an up-
per bound on the computational resources required for reach-
ing consensus. To the best of our knowledge, FedCoin is the
first attempt to leverage blockchain technology in federated
learning incentive scheme research. It opens up new opportu-
nities for entities which has computational resources but with-
out local data to contribute to federated learning.
2 Related Work
The incentive mechanism design is an important research di-
rection in the field of federated learning [Kairouz et al., 2019;
Yang et al., 2019a]. In [Kang et al., 2019], the contract the-
ory is employed to improve the accuracy of model training
considering the unreliable data contributors. A consortium
blockchain architecture is applied to build a decentralized
reputation system. In [Khan et al., 2019], a Stackelberg-game
based incentive mechanism is designed to optimize the utili-
ties of both FL clients and the FL server. These works focus
on optimizing the rewards for self-interested FL clients and
FL customers who pay to use the FL model. Our study is
compatible with these works in terms of determining the pay-
ment budget for the FL customers.
In field of ML, SV has also be studied widely for vari-
ous purpose. SV can be applied in feature selection, ranking
the importance of training data, which is further applied in
explaining the behavior of ML models [Li and Cui, 2019].
Since the computation complexity is O(n!), approximations
of SV also attract many attentions. In [Ancona et al., 2019], a
polynomial-time approximation of SV is proposed for deep
neural network. Group sampling based approximation is
studied in [Jia et al., 2019]. In this work, our objective is
not to decrease the computational complexity, but to establish
a scheme so that distributed computational resources, which
are otherwise wasted, can be leveraged to help FL systems
calculate SVs.
Blockchain has been widely applied in addressing the se-
curity problems in FL applications [Dillenberger et al., 2019;
Kairouz et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2019a]. FLChain [Bao et al.,
2019] and BlockFL [Kim et al., 2019] have been proposed
to record the local model parameter updates in the temper-
resistant manner. A blockchain-based FL was proposed in
[Ramanan et al., 2019] so as to remove the need for an FL
server. A blockchain-based trust management system was
proposed in [Kang et al., 2019] to assist FL server to select
reliable and high quality data owners as FL clients. These
blockchain systems are used as immutable ledgers to record
local gradients and aggregate them in a trusted manner. Our
work will adopt the blockchain network as a computational
engine and payment distribution ledger, which is the first of
its kind in the current literature.
3 Preliminaries
For a typical FL scenario, we take Fi(w) = `(xi, yi;wt) as
the loss of prediction on a sample (xi,yi) with model parame-
tersw at the t-th round. The parameterswt is a d-dimensional
vector. We assume that there are K clients, and each client
has a local data setDk with nk = |Dk|. The overall dataset is
D = {D1, . . . ,DK} with n = |D| =
∑K
k=1 nk. The objec-
tive function to be optimized is:
min
w∈Rd
F(w) where F(w) = 1
n
K∑
k=1
∑
i∈Dk
Fi(w) (1)
This optimization problem is generally solved by stochas-
tic gradient descent (SGD) [Goodfellow et al., 2016] based
methods. For example, based on the current model wt, the
federated averaging algorithm [McMahan et al., 2017] com-
putes the average gradient gtk =
1
nk
∑
i∈Dk ∇Fi(wt) on the
local data of client k. Each client updates its local model
wt+1k ← wt − ηgtk, and the FL server aggregates the local
models as the global FL model.
wt+1 ← A({wkt+1|k = 1, . . . ,K}) (2)
where A is an aggregation function.
4 FedCoin
There are two networks of participants in our system: 1) the
FL network, and 2) the peer-to-peer blockchain network (Fig-
ure 1). A FL model requester or FL training task requester
Figure 1: Overview of the Proposed Model
refers to the entities who need to train an FL network and
with a budget of V . In the FL network, there is a centralized
server, referred as FL server, in coordinating the executing
of model training and receiving payment V from FL model
requester.
The distributed data owners, called as FL clients, partici-
pate in a collaborative training task and receive a payment V .
Each FL client trains its local model and submits the parame-
ter updates to the FL server. The FL server plays three roles.
Firstly, it publishes a training task to FL clients with price
TrainPrice. Secondly, it aggregates local updates through a
secure aggregation protocol [Bonawitz et al., 2017] and earns
a computation payment (ComPrice). Thirdly, it transfer a pro-
cessing fee SapPrice to the blockchain network to enlist its
members’ help in calculating the FL model. The total pay-
ment of the task (TrainPrice+ComPrice+SapPrice) should be
not greater than V in order to sustain payment balance with-
out relying on external transfer of values into this system.
After each global model update, the FL server publishes
a task to calculate the contribution by each FL client. The
consensus nodes in blockchain network then collaboratively
calculate SVs, and the block winner receives a payment of
TrainPrice+SapPrice. The winner then divides ComPrice to
FL clients according to their respective SVs by creating trans-
actions in the blockchain. In our current design, we only re-
ward clients with postive contributions, but refrain from pe-
nalizing clients with negative contributions. All the transac-
tions are recorded in the new block and further updated to the
chain.
Therefore, the connection between FL network and
blockchain network is a special type of task. A task includes
the received local update set W = {wk|k = 1, . . . ,K}, the
aggregation function A, the loss function F(w), and values
SapPrice and TrainPrice for each update round. Note that
SapPrice and TrainPrice decreases as the number of training
rounds increases, and the total payment for training can be di-
vided among the rounds equally or not. Without loss of gen-
erality, the following description focuses on a single training
round.
4.1 Shapley Value Based Blockchain Consensus
Upon receiving a Shapley value calculation task from the FL
network, the miners in the blockchain network are to calcu-
late the SV vector S = [sk]k∈[1,K] where sk is the SV of
the client in providing wk ∈ W . Each miner independently
calculates the SV vector following Algorithm 1. Since the
objective of the mining process is to competitively calculate
SV vectors so as to prove the miner’s computation power, we
name the algorithm as “Proof of Shapley (PoSap)”. The in-
put of Algorithm 1 comes from the task specifications from
the FL network. The output is a new generated block.
In Algorithm 1, a miner first initializes the SV vector as
an all-zero vector, and sets the calculation iteration number
as 0 (Line 1-2). The SV computation continues as long as
one of the following two conditions are satisfied: 1) there is
no new block received; or 2) the received block fails to pass
the verification which is specified in Algorithm 2 (Line 3).
The SV calculation process is described in Line 4 to Line 13.
The miner initializes a temporary SV vector St to record the
calculated value in this iteration (Line 4). Then, the miner
randomly generates a rank of the K FL clients (Line 5). Ac-
cording to the rank, an SV of the first entity is calculated as
in Line 6, which is the contribution of the entity to the loss
function (Line 6)). For the next entity i, the Shapley value
is calculated as its marginal contribution (Line 7-10). S is
updated by averaging all the previous iterations and the cur-
rent St (Line 11). The iteration time is then incremented by 1
(Line 12). Then, the entity broadcast S and time (Line 13).
Whenever a miner receives S and time, the miner calcu-
lates the average results S of all the received S (Line 16).
Then, the miner calculates the P -distance between its own
S and S. When the distance is no greater than the mining
difficulty D, the miner becomes the winner and generates a
new block Blk (Line 18). The difficulty D is adapted dy-
namically as explained in Section 4.2. The illustration of the
Shapley based verification is shown in Figure 2. The new
block is then appended to the current longest chain.
Whenever a miner receives a new block Blk, the miner
verifies this block according to Algorithm 2. Once the verifi-
Algorithm 1: Proof of Shapley (PoSap)
Input: F : Loss function;
A: Aggregation function;
W : Contribution of FL clients in size K;
D: Difficulty in Mining;
Output: Blk: a new block
1 Initialize S = [sk = 0|k = 1, . . . ,K];
2 time=0;
3 while No received Blk OR !VerifyBlock(Blk) do
4 St = [sk = 0|k = 1, . . . ,K]% temporary store S
5 Random generate a rank R = [rk|k = 1, . . . ,K];
6 St(R(1)) = F(A(W (R(1))));
7 for i from 2 to K do
8 St(R(i)) = F(A(W (R(1 : i))));
9 St(R(i)) = St(R(i))−
∑i−1
j=1 St(R(j));
10 end
11 S = S×time+Sttime+1 ;
12 time=time+1;
13 Broadcast S and time;
14 end
15 if Receive a new S then
16 Average the Received S to S =
∑
time×S∑
time ;
17 if ‖S − S‖p ≤ D then
18 Create a new block Blk after longest chain;
19 Broadcast Blk;
20 return Blk;
21 end
22 end
23 if Receive a new Blk then
24 if VerifyBlock(Blk)==ture then
25 Update Blk to its chain;
26 return Blk;
27 end
28 end
cation passes, the block is appended to the miner’s chain, and
the mining process terminates (Line 23-28).
The structure of a block is shown in Figure 3, including
block header and block body. The block header includes
seven pieces of information, Table 1 presents the explanation
about each header item. The block body records two types
of data: (1) The task specification including all the inputs for
Algorithm 1; and (2) The transactions in the blockchain net-
work. Here, a transaction is denoted as a certain amount of
FedCoins transferred from a user account to another, which
is similar to that in BitCoin [Nakamoto and others, 2008].
The block winner has the privilege to create special transac-
tions: transferring TrainPrice from its own account to to the
FL clients according to S. The detailed design is explained in
Section 4.3.
The verification procedure is described as in Algorithm 2.
Three conditions must be satisfied for a block to successfully
pass the verification. The first condition is ‖St − St‖p ≤ D
which aims to verify whether the winner has generated the
block with a valid SV calculation result. The second con-
Figure 2: Shapley Valued based Consensus Protocol
Figure 3: Block Structure in FedCoin
Table 1: Explanation of Block Header
Type Explanations
Block ID The block height
Winner’s ID Identity of the block generator
Averaged S The calculated Shapley vector in
Line 15 of Algorithm.1
Previous Hash Hash value of previous block based
on a hash function, e.g. SHA 256
Winner’s S The Shapley vector calculated by
the winner
Difficulty The required difficulty D
Merkel Tree Root Root of Merkel tree organized with
transactions in block body
dition is ‖S − St‖p ≤ D which requires that the S value
of the block should be close enough to the local aggregated
S. S should be equal to St when the blockchain network is
synchronized. In an asychronized network, this condition re-
quires that the winner should aggregate a sufficient number
of results from other entities. Thirdly, the current block ID
should be the largest to ensure that only the longest chain is
acceptable. This longest chain principle can effectively avoid
forking, resulting in consistent chain status in a distributed
network.
4.2 Dynamic Mining Difficulty
The difficulty level in mining new blocks can be adapted dy-
namically. There are two main factors influencing the diffi-
culty updates: 1) the total mining power of the miners and
2) the speed of generating a block. Given the same min-
ing power, the difficulty level should be decreased as the the
Algorithm 2: VerifyBlock (new Blk)
Input: Blk: Received new block;
S: Local average of received Shapley Value;
D: Difficulty in Mining;
Output: ValuationResult: True OR False
1 St = Blk.S; St = Blk.S;
2 if ‖St − St‖p ≤ D then
3 if ‖S − St‖p ≤ D then
4 if Blk.ID≥ longest chain length then
5 return ValuationResult=ture;
6 end
7 else
8 return ValuationResult=false;
9 end
10 end
11 else
12 return ValuationResult=false;
13 end
14 end
15 else
16 return ValuationResult=false;
17 end
block generation speed increases. Given the same block gen-
eration speed, the difficulty level should be increased as the
mining power increases. Difficulty update can be achieved by
deploying a smart contract. For example, in BitCoin, a block
is generated in every ten minutes and the difficulty level is
updated in every two-week duration.
4.3 The Payment Scheme
With the FedCoin system in place, an FL model requester
starts by depositing V FedCoins in the FL server. The value
of V shall be no greater than the value of the FL model for the
requester. To divide V among FL clients, blockchain miners,
and the FL server, all the entities should register a transaction
account. The value of V is then divided into three parts.
• TrainPrice: payments to the FL clients;
• ComPrice: payment to the FL sever for processing the
model aggregation;
• SapPrice: payments to the blockchain network miners
for calculating the Shapley value of each client.
The division can be determined by a pre-agreed smart
contract. For example, the division contract could
specify that TrainPrice:ComPrice:SapPrice=7:1:2. Then,
TrainPrice=0.7V , ComPrice=0.1V , and SapPrice=0.2V . The
specific payment scheme is shown in Algorithm 3.
In Algorithm 3, a model training task is successfully ac-
cepted by the FL server whenever the server receives payment
V from the FL model requester. The payment of V is con-
firmed when the transfer transaction (requester V−→server) is
recorded in the blockchain. The server then calculates Train-
Price and SapPrice and leaving ComPrice=V-TrainPrice-
SapPrice as its own payment for processing the task (Line
2). The training task is then published to FL clients with
Algorithm 3: The Payment Scheme in FedCoin
Input: V: The value paid by a model requester;
S: The final aggragated Shapley Value;
Output: An allocation of V
1 while FL server receives V from a model requester do
2 Calculate TrainPrice and SapPrice;
3 Publish traing task with price TrainPrice;
4 if The model is well trained then
5 Publish a Shapley task to blockchain network
with pirce SapPrice;
6 end
7 end
8 while a new block is mined do
9 FL server transfers TrainPrice+SapPrice to the block
winner; for each FL client i do
10 if Si > 0 then
11 pi =
Si∑
Sj>0
Sj
TrainPrice;
12 block winner transfers pi to i;
13 end
14 end
15 end
price TrainPrice (Line 3). When the training task is com-
pleted, the server then publishes a SV calculation task to the
blockchain network with price SapPrice (Line 4-6). As the
blockchain network completes the task by successfully min-
ing a new block, the server creates a transaction to transfer
TrainPrice+SapPrice to the block winner. The block win-
ner creates the transactions in dividing TrainPrice to the FL
clients with positive Shapley value. All the transactions as
well as submitted unconfirmed transactions are stored in the
new block.
5 Analysis
Under FedCoin, the decentralized payment scheme is reliable
based on the security of proposed PoSap consensus protocol.
Each miner who successfully calculated the sufficiently con-
verging SV is allowed to record a set of transactions and re-
ceive payment from the FL server. The more mining power
(i.e. resources) a miner applies, the higher its chances to be-
come a block winner. PoSap provides incentives for miners
to contribute their resources to the system, and is essential to
the decentralized nature of the proposed payment system.
The security of PoSap is also similar to that of the BitCoin
system. Empirical evidence shows that Bitcoin miners may
form pools in order to decrease the variance among their in-
comes. Within such pools, all members contribute to the solu-
tion of each cryptopuzzle, and share the rewards proportion-
ally to their contributions. Ideally, a feasible payment system
should be designed to resist the formation of large mining
pools. Bitcoin system has been shown to be vulnerable when
a mining pool attracts more than 50% of the miners. Simi-
larly, the proposed system can also only resist upto 50% of
the miners colluding.
Next we discuss how our system fares against the selfish
mining strategy [Eyal and Sirer, 2018].
Observation 1 When the FL server processes FL training
model requests sequentially, it is not rational for colluders
to follow the selfish mining strategy.
According to Algorithm 3, each public block winner is paid
by the FL server before creating a new block containing the
block reward payment transactions. When the training task is
processed one by one, if a selfish miner becomes the winner
but does not publish this result immedietely, it cannot receive
the block rewards. Meanwhile, the selfish miner cannot mine
the next block without publishing its private block since the
next SV task must wait for the completion of payment in the
current block in the setting of sequentially training models.
Observation 2 When the FL server processes FL training
model requests in parallel, and all the miners have the same
block propogation delay to the FL server, the expected rev-
enue for selfish miner is greater than that for honest miners
when the selfish pool attracts more then 25% of the total min-
ing power in the blockchain network.
If the tasks are published in parallel, a selfish miner can re-
serve a block and continue to mine the next block. The state
transation and revene analysis is same as that in [Eyal and
Sirer, 2018], resulting the condition of the threshold of self-
ish pool’s mining power to be 1/4 under the condition of the
same propogation delay to the FL server. Thus, processing FL
training model requests in parallel under the proposed scheme
is not recommended.
6 Experimental Evaluation
To evaluate the proposed FedCoin, we set up a blockchain
environment and design a federated learning task based on a
real-world dataset. The objective of the experiments is to ver-
ify whether FedCoin can promote high quality data from dis-
tributed clients and whether the computational cost of PoSap
is feasible.
6.1 Experiment Settings
We design our experiment based on a well-known digit clas-
sification dataset - MNIST with 70,000 images and a widely
used software environment - TensorFlow - to perform feder-
ated digit classification tasks.
We set up a FL server and 100 FL clients. The MNIST
dataset is divided among the clients such that their data qual-
ity vary. We set there are 10 groups of 10 clients each. Clients
from each group own datasets which belong to one of the
10 preset quality levels. We refer to this quality level as a
client’s type. Each client of type Tj is randomly assigned a
training set following a uniform distribution over the 10 − j
class labels (j = 0, 1, · · · , 9) as its local dataset. The FL
training model in our experiments is classical neural network.
We adopt the popular FedAvg as the FL aggragtion function,
which averages the collected local model parameters to de-
rive the global FL model parameters. Each local client trains
the model for 20 iterations.
The consensus nodes are generated based on Docker. Each
consensus node can independantly communicate with each
other by sending messages, performing Shapley value calcu-
lation tasks following PoSap, and verifying blocks. The total
Figure 4: The Shapley Values Calculated in
FedCoin for Clients in Different Types
Figure 5: The Shapley Values Calculated in
FedCoin for Clients in Different Types
Figure 6: The Block Generation Time With Min-
ing Varied Difficulty
computational power is equal to that of our simulation plat-
form (CPU Interl i7-7700, GPU 2G, RAM 8g, ROM 1t, SSD
256M). We set p = 2 (Euler distance) in PoSap for comparing
mining difficulty.
6.2 Data Quality Evaluation
We adopt Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) as a metric to mea-
sure the data quality from the perspective of data reliability
in this experiment [Zhao et al., 2018]. EMD captures the dis-
tance for a client’s training data distribution compared to a
given distribution. Here, we use the distribution of the whole
MINIST dataset as the comparison benchmark. A high EMD
value for a given dataset indicates that the datast is of low
quality. The data quality measured by EMD for each client
type is shown in Table 2. We can observe that the data quality
linearly decreases from T0 to T9
Table 2: Data quality of each client type.
Data Type T0 T1 T2 T3 T4
Quality (EMD) 0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
Data Type T5 T6 T7 T8 T9
Quality (EMD) 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
6.3 Results and Discussion
The average Shapley values calculated by FedCoin for the
clients belonging to each type are shown in Figure 4. The
results in Figure 4 show that the proposed FedCoin approach
can accurately compute clients’ Shaply Values which are crit-
ical to incentive mechanisms designed for federated learning.
We can also observe that the computed Shapley values of
client type T0 is higher than all the other clients with lower
data quality. The Shapley values decrease with the qual-
ity level decays from T1 to T9. Moreover, only the values
for type T0 to T4 are positive, indicating that only half of
the clients can positively contribute model accuracy improve-
ment. It also shows that our PoSap can effectively promote
high quality data in collabratively FL application scenrio. The
negative Shapley values for type T5 to T9 means the clients
can mislead the model training.
To empirically explain why there is negative Shapley val-
ues, we train the same model with clients from each type
separately. The testing accuracy of the model trained by 10
clients in each type is presented in Figure 5. It has been found
that the model accuracy based data from clients with negative
Shapley values is indeed lower than the accuracy achieved in
the FL model based on the 100 clients. In our system, we will
not reward the clients with negative Shapley values, discour-
aging these clients in misleading the model training.
The block generation time with different mining difficulty
values is shown in Figure 6. It is measured in the unit of
Shapley calculation iterations, each of which executing Lines
3 to 14 in Algorithm 1 once. The x-axis contains the difficulty
value in the form of−log(D) (e.g., x = 2meansD = 1e−2).
The y-axis contains the corresponding time required to gener-
ate a new block measured in Shapley calculation iterations ex-
ecuted by the block winner. It can be observed that the block
generation time increases as the mining difficulty increases.
As the mining difficulty increases beyond 1e−3 (D < 1e−3),
the block generation time converges at about 2,500 Shapley
calculation iterations. This shows that the computational cost
for the consensus nodes is upper-bounded. In other words,
the computational cost of PoSap is feasible.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we propose FedCoin - a blockchain-based pay-
ment system to enable a federated learning system. It can
mobilize free computational resources in the community to
perform costly computing tasks required by FL incentive
schemes. The Shapley value of each FL client, reflecting its
contribution to the global FL model in a fair way, is calculated
by the proof of Shapley (PoSap) consensus protocol. The pro-
posed PoSap which replaces the traditional hash-based pro-
tocol in existing Bitcoin based blockchain systems. All the
payments are recorded in the block in an immutable manner.
Under FedCoin, paying out incentives to FL clients does not
need to rely on a central FL server.
Experimental results show that FedCoin is able to prop-
erly determine FL clients’ Shapley Value-based contribution
to the global FL model with an upper bound on the computa-
tional resource required for reaching consensus. To the best
of our knowledge, FedCoin is the first attempt to leverage
blockchain technology in federated learning incentive scheme
research. Thereby, it opens up new opportunities for non-data
owners to contribute to the development of the FL ecosystem
[Yang et al., 2019b].
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